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Originally Posted by wwfan
Introduction
I hope SI forgive me for saying so, but as of yet their arguably unparalleled simulation of football management fails in one respect to live up to the real thing. It is not yet sophisticated enough tactically. I know that some of you who are struggling with the game may sit with gaping mouths when reading this and think my brain has become addled, but I’ll explain.
In the modern game of football it is next to impossible to come up with a tactical formation that top clubs boasting experienced managers and quality players are unable to outperform with some degree of consistency. If it could happen then by now a smaller side would have won the Premiership via sheer tactical nous alone. Yet it hasn’t happened and is increasingly unlikely to. Why? Simple. Money and quality always, always outperforms lack of quality. Tactical mistakes from big sides (picking the wrong player for the match, being too attacking, too defensive) may allow a small side to win the odd match, but it won’t happen with regularity. Witness Man Utd’s return to the 4-4-2 that has been the cornerstone of their success and the required ditching of a work-shy goal poacher to accommodate it. Did Ferguson make tactical errors over the last two years? Undoubtedly he did. Did he buy the wrong players? Indisputably. Has he learned from his mistakes? Seems he has. Did Man Utd finish outside the top four in those 4-5-1 days, a position most fans of small clubs would die for? Not once!
The FM tacticians still have a serious advantage over real life managers. They can exploit tactical weaknesses in general terms that don’t exist in the real world. A new system of play can undermine the carefully thought out logic of the game-engine and allow a user team to outperform the AI despite a serious quality gap in personnel. That rarely happens in real life. A team will only get promoted if its squad is among the better squads in the division. Yes, the best team may not win the title and tactical variations can give slight advantages, but they are slight only. Until this version of FM this has not been the case in our virtual world. Many tactics have outperformed the AI in ways that could never happen in real life, with Diablo being the most notable. SI obviously want to eliminate this, as a simulation’s main intention is to successfully mimic real life. So, each version of the game sees a battle between developer and tactical guru, as one tries to build a more and more realistic system of play and the other tries to undermine it with creative tactical innovations. So far, the gurus have always won.
Both FM06 and FM07 began their shelf-lives with constant criticism from consumers. ‘The game is too hard’, ‘tactics are too complex’, ‘it’s unrealistic that I can’t get Chelsea to win the title in my first season’ are common complaints. These should read ‘the game is hard because it is more realistic and thus bad user tactics get ripped apart by AI managers that know what they are doing’ and ‘I can’t get Chelsea to win the title in my first season because I’m a newbie manager who really doesn’t know what he is doing which is realistic in the extreme.’ In ’06 the tactical gurus then kicked in and new ways of tactic creation were explained and implemented and the SI forums went quiet. Some of the theories and tactics, as in previous versions, went on to have seminal status. In ’07 these have yet to arrive.
Have SI finally defeated the tactical gurus and developed a tactical system that constantly prevents user systems from outperforming the game-engine? I think they are close, but they are not there yet. I’m still performing much better than my player quality would suggest I should, although I haven’t reached the comfort zone I achieved in ’06 in which I could sit back and relax after 10 minutes of a game in 95% security I would get a draw at least. I have to remain focussed all game. But, I believe I am outperforming the game-engine, and am within touching distance of cracking it. I will certainly dominate divisions with players equal to or above the divisional average, which is what we are all trying to do.
The rest of this article/thread discusses the whys and wherefores of tactical methodologies, their strengths and limitations and argues that a whole new mind-set is required when designing tactics in ’07. Finally, it offers the beginnings of some theories and frameworks that will, hopefully, allow users to create solid tactics and reduce their frustrations.
Three Philosophies of Tactic-Building
There are many individual philosophies concerning tactic building in the T&TT Forum. Some ‘gurus’ prefer highly complex methodologies consisting of tactics for every situations. Others prefer simplified approaches that require little tweaking or adjustment. Others still try to construct weird asymmetrical formations that confuse the AI and take advantage of engine weaknesses. This opening section will analyse the intricacies of the different approaches.
Complex
I would be regarded as a ‘complex guru’. My tactics and threads take into consideration the minutiae of the tactical settings and require considerable building and setting up before game-play begins. I demand individual mentality settings for each player and different home and away settings for individuals and the team as a whole. My theories have been criticised as being too anal and determent on constant minor tweaks before coming to fruition.
These criticisms have always rankled. My own take on my approach is that I try to build a logical mentality framework that can be adjusted to suit any formation, within which individual settings can be manipulated to produce the required results. The framework I devised in ’06 did that exceptionally well and allowed me, towards the end of 06’s shelf-life, to be able to showboat, switching between formations as and when I pleased with no detrimental affect on performance. The football was fluid and effective, capable of scoring goals and keeping things tight defensively. At no point did I believe it was over complex or reliant on slight slider tweaks. The mentality framework was logical, as were the home and away settings, and I rarely thought about minor slider adjustments. Once it was right, it was right.
Yet, I became a victim of my own success. Within 10 minutes of any game I would be able to see if my chosen tactical-flavour was the right one and either leave the game to run, or switch to another system before the opposition had too many chances and win the match in the second half. I only lost 5 or 6 games in total in all competitions over my last four seasons. My interest waned as the game became too easy and I began to play half-heartedly. Although it is fun winning there does need to be a challenge. When ’07 came out I hoped it would answer said challenge and it has not disappointed. I will further this discussion later in the ‘Demise’ of the Rule of Two.
Simple
The archetypal ‘simple’ approach is the Slider Apathy favoured by Asmodeus. It is based (or was based in ’06) on a dual mentality setting which linked strikers to defenders by use of a high defensive line. This enabled the team to remain compact whilst ensuring five players defended and five attacked at all times. Other settings were left to user preference as to their judgement of player ability. It produced a different style of play than the Rule of Two system I was using, but was equally effective. Unlike myself, Asmodeus has never been accused of over-complexity and his ideas and system, although theoretically and intellectually sound, offered effective tactics for the more casual game-player. Like myself, Asmodeus built tactics that out-performed the game engine (and here’s the rub, to be discussed later).
Asymmetrical
The asymmetrical ‘gurus’ build tactics that rely on formations that would be unthinkable in real-life football. Four-three-threes with weird side-arrows are the most common variant but there are others. I would also place Diablo, with its long-farrowed MC, in this category even though it is not asymmetrical, as a midfielder constantly sprinting half the length of the pitch to become an auxiliary centre-forward is highly unrealistic. These tactics all work(ed) because they challenged the logistics of the game-engine and took advantage of scenarios unimagined by the programmers. Another example of the AI failing to deal with unrealistic tactical plans is the ‘everyone at the back post’ corner routine which warped any testing of ’06 tactics as it guaranteed too many goals from set-pieces.
It is easy to write off the asymmetrical tactical gurus as game-engine hackers who search for bugs and errors within the engine and exploit them. Their tactics have little to do with real football and a lot to do with the difficulties of programming a football simulation that can cope with unrealistic and unexpected systems of play. These tactics have their place, as they will help SI develop an understanding of where their game-engine holes are located so they can fill them. They are also the result of highly creative thinking and analysis and should be commended. However, that doesn’t stop me from hoping that they all fail. Once asymmetrical tactics fail to out-perform the engine then a greater level of realism will have been reached than ever before. I think ’07 may well have reached this plateau.
Before I am attacked by the asymmetrical gurus, I wish to state here and now that I also regard my and Asmodeus’s systems as ones that took advantage of inadequacies in the game-engine and should be as equally open to criticism as asymmetrical tactics. The following section will explain why I have come to think this way.
The ‘Demise’ of the Rule of Two and Slider Apathy
Demise is too strong a word. The Rule of Two still works and, judging from Asmodeus’s New Year resurrection of Slider Apathy, so do his theories. However, they are seriously challenged by the new engine and nowhere near as effective as before. Rule of Two still over-performs in terms of results but not in terms of possession, chance creation and fluidity of play. It would be relatively easy to remain on the Rule of Two bandwagon and still do quite well. But ‘well’ is not enough. I want to be able to dominate possession, play pretty football, score well worked goals and win in some style and the Rule of Two does not do this. I’ll try to explain why and how I think its dominance has been challenged.
Defensive Line and Mentality
Arguably, the reprogramming of the defensive line and increased mentality differentials have been the undoing of both the Rule of Two and dual mentality frameworks. In ’06 employing a high defensive line kept both types of formation tight and allowed for solid defence and fluid attack. The user had the best of both worlds. His team could be both defensive and attacking at the same time. The game-engine couldn’t cope with this and both systems out-performed to a huge degree. In this respect they are no different to the asymmetrical tactics I challenged before, with the exception that they were built on logical frames that the game designers hadn’t foreseen, rather than exploiting holes and gaps with weird arrows and positions.
The reworking of the defensive line, so that it only kicks in when a team loses possession, is one of the key elements that have forced an alteration of approach for the tactical gurus. Any formation that relies on heavily split mentalities will struggle with the gaps in and behind the defence that a high line leaves with low mentality defenders or a low line leaves with high mentality midfielders. The defence retreats more quickly than the midfield so there is too little cover in front of it and the defenders becomes horribly exposed. This affect is minimised by working out the average mentality for the team and then giving the defensive line the same slider setting, but this still fails to combat the other main issue of heavily split mentalities, which is player confusion.
Mentality has been reworked so that on field mentality differences are more acute than previously. Thus, a heavy mentality split will produce a loose formation that offers a lot of space that a tight, (near) global mentality system then exploits. This weakness of this type of tactic is accentuated by player confusion as to where they should be passing. A player with a low mentality is unlikely to play a risky ball to a high mentality player up the pitch and instead will pass to a player with similar mentality settings, which leads to lots of aimless passes between the back four and a defensive mentality midfielder. Eventually possession is lost as the opposition closes them down and the team is under pressure. The risk of such play is minimised by employing defensive midfielders who sit in front of the back four and protect it from counters whilst still being high mentality enough to launch attacks of their own. The best Rule of Two tactical set I have seen employs one or two defensive midfielders in all its flavours. However, it seems next to impossible to build a fluent 4-4-2 using the Rule of Two framework.
Width
Although not as influential as the defensive line and mentality, width has also been reworked in ’07 and requires a different outlook. In ’06, to get the full-backs into space to cross and defeat the 3-3-2-1-1 you were required to give them short-farrows. In ’07 as long as you have a normal width and mixed forward runs on the full-backs they will overlap and support the attack. As goals per game have decreased dramatically, overlapping full-backs are necessary to defeat tight AI formations and they only do so with low split mentalities and a reasonably wide formation.
Conclusion
Both the Rule of Two and Slider Apathy theories took advantage of game-engine weaknesses, albeit in a logical manner, that the developers hadn’t foreseen. As in previous generations of FM, these weaknesses have been largely wiped out by reworking the engine, thereby reducing their effectiveness. Neither of them are toothless but they are more frustrating than in ’06 and both almost certainly require DMCs to function. Neither will adapt comfortably to the most common formation in football, the 4-4-2, and therefore their validity must be questioned. Hence, a strategic rethink is required.
Apologies to Asmodeus if his Slider Apathy is working as well as it was in ’06. According to his posts and my assumptions it shouldn’t be, but I haven‘t tried it and am basing my arguments on observation of the match engine and his own comments on the validity of his theory
Rethinking Strategy
As I stated previously, my Rule of Two tactics were overachieving in terms of results, but not in terms of style. My original post in ’06 suggested that the match engine was flawed and that it was impossible to make a decent 4-4-2. I disproved my own argument over a period of intense experimentation and constructed a solid 4-4-2 which eventually evolved into a diamond. It became more complex as I began to better understand the game and resulted in the Tactical Theorems and Frameworks thread that ran to three incarnations prior to this one. Hopefully, this thread will be as popular and useful as its predecessors.
Unfortunately, or fortunately in real terms as my life is considerably more fun and interesting than it was in late 2005, I don’t have as much time to devote to Football Manager as I did. Come January 2007 I am only 9 matches in to my 5th season. Therefore, I don’t have as much time to experiment with tactics as I did previously and thus my approach has been different. In ’06 I downloaded and rejected a series of so-called super tactics before embarking on a mission to design a logical framework. This required a huge amount of testing and game-play. For ’07, much of this testing has been carried out by others (Supersaint, El Padre, crazy gra, Beevster, The New Diaby, thegooner spring to mind) and for that I thank them. From their writings and observations I was able to build a reasonably complex theoretical picture of how the game worked which allowed me to circumnavigate a lot of the testing. The following is a rough guide to my thought processes in terms of re-imagining tactical excellence in ’07. As in ’06, I was working entirely towards producing a solid 4-4-2 that could perform above the ability of the AI. Also, as in ’06 my testing team was a team that had been promoted to a Regional Conference division the previous season (Maidenhead in ’06, Blyth in ’07), so was low in terms of quality.
For a long time I remained trapped in the Rule of Two approach to mentality. I adjusted many tactical elements of the game in trying to get RoT working well. All of them failed on one count. I could get results but not the performance I wanted. Possession was low, shot count was low. The one thing that stood in its favour, and the element that SI has still failed to resolve in dealing with heavy split mentality systems, was the percentage of goals scored per shot on target. Rule of Two still guarantees a few really good chances every game as the high mentality split forces the odd overload of the AI’s defence, but it happens with much less frequency than in ’06. Eventually, I became frustrated with the system (exactly paralleling my experiences in ’06 as I gained promotion in the play-offs first season but wasn’t happy with playing style) and began to play around with different mentality settings.
For a while I played around with the Ro3, in which each stratum of the team (defence, midfield, attack) operated on the same mentality split by three from the stratum above it. Thus, defence would be 6, midfield 9, attack 12. However, there were no perceivable benefits and I scrapped it. I also experimented with Supersaint’s take on the Rule of Two in which attacking systems would start with the central defence on 10 and defensive ones with the central defence on 2 with adjusted defensive line and closing down for each system. There was some improvement, but not to the extent I wished. At this stage I began to get frustrated and played around with global mentalities and slightly split mentalities, but I still couldn’t get things working the way I wanted. Finally, as I was about to permanently dent my forehead from constantly bashing it on a wall, I came across a thread offering a different perspective.
I hope he won’t mind me saying this, but the majority of this user’s threads and comments are less than sophisticated and generally limited in their worth. This one, however, offered me the building blocks for a series of mentality frameworks that finally got my team performing in the manner I wanted. Titled simply ‘Experiment’, this thread by PAGEY124 revolutionised my thinking, and were it not for its existence I doubt I would be writing this thread right now. Implementing its mentality settings, although not his other suggestions, immediately produced the requisite quality change in playing style and the mentality frameworks I had been searching for.
As in ’06, once I had a mentality framework I was happy with, it became relatively easy to build a decent 4-4-2. I tend to build from defence, first concentrating on preventing goals and then scoring them. As soon as I implemented the new mentality frameworks my defence tightened immeasurably. Indeed, my early versions of the tactics were so defensively sound I only conceded through defensive errors (exasperating but something you have to live with) or via set-pieces. I was conceding circa 0.3 a game which is a decent record when you are predicted to come 17th in the Conference National. Unfortunately, I wasn’t scoring many goals, with most matches being 1-0, 0-1, 1-1 or 0-0. I was happy with that short-term but needed to improve the attacking variations and quality in order to be entirely satisfied. I won the Conference by 3 points and readied myself for further experimentation the next season.
In my RoT tactics in the first two seasons of ‘07 I used a tall target man who was undisputedly my best player in terms of performance if not attributes. I had stopped using one after he retired but felt that as it was so effective in the Conference North it should be equally effective with a slightly better target man in L2 (two promotions in three seasons), so I splashed out my first significant outlay (16 grand) on a target man who had been solid if unspectacular in the Conference National to see if I could get him working in L2. Initially, I used balls to head to get him winning flick-ons to the left-winger and the other centre-forward, but they were failing due to my short passing system. In order to get more out of him I switched to direct passing for my defenders, and shortly afterwards mixed for my central midfielders, and he exploded into life. My goal-scoring rocketed (in relative terms) from being less than 1 a game to circa 1.7 a game by the end of the season. This may not sound like much but was in the top three performers in the division, with my defensive record being far and away the best.
I now had a system I was reasonably satisfied with. It was defensively solid, offered enough chances both home and away to grab wins or draws in most matches, and the target man was the form player in the division. Player weakness (I was predicted to come 24th) stopped it from being all it could be, but I ended up winning the division by circa 20 points. It was a little one-dimensional, but ready for upload. I tested it out with a supporting thread in another forum and after a few good responses linked to it in Tactical Theorems and Frameworks to see how it fared. Again, the reaction was positive. Another user whose opinion I trust implicitly (The Next Diaby) has also reworked the framework into a diamond and pronounced it equally valid in that formation. I have since tweaked it some more, but the basic settings remain. So, after a long journey, often paved with jagged stones, I am ready to write a new set of Theorems and Frameworks, which takes me up to this thread and my next heading.
Quote:
Theorems and Frameworks ‘07
Frameworks
The aim of Tactical Theorems and Frameworks has always been to provide a systematic approach to tactical building that users can apply across the board, no matter what team or what level. The following is no different and a logical and systematic application of the frameworks described below and related theories should guarantee quality performance. As in previous renditions, the framework section focuses entirely on mentality settings, whereas the theorems section deals with all other aspects of tactic design. The frameworks below are no longer based on the Rule of Two and, for simplicity’s sake, will be known as the Rule of One. With luck they will produce the same level of user performance in ’07 as the Rule of Two framework did in ’06.
As mentioned before, I am not refuting the validity of the Rule of Two or Slider Apathy frameworks in totality; rather I am suggesting they require DMCs (and possibly AMCs) to function and are thus unable to meet the requirements of the 4-4-2 formation. They definitely require multi-strata formations of some kind in order to reach the effectiveness level of ’06. As the 4-4-2 is the cornerstone formation of modern football (1966-2000) a new framework is required. Alternate, super-modern formations, such as Benitez’s 4-2-3-1 or Mourinho’s 4-5-1/4-3-3, should still lend themselves to RoT or SA as they both use DMCs.
In advocating new frameworks for the 4-4-2, I am being forced to switch to multi-flavoured tactics for a variety of home and away situations. User intuition will then decide on which framework to implement for which situation. Inevitably, some user choices will be wrong and performance will suffer. This cannot be avoided and is part and parcel of the trials and tribulations of real and virtual management. Some of the side effects of bad choice making can be negated through other tactical elements, which will be theorised later. However, user error must be kept in mind when applying the following frameworks and in-match flexibility and adjustment is a necessity.
The key to building a successful mentality framework is to envision the system that the AI will use and implement a tactic that first negates and then outperforms it. In designing my current set of frameworks I followed the basic premise that stopping the other team scoring guaranteed a level of performance from which I could experiment in terms of attacking strategy. After eliminating the vagaries of performance due to excellent or poor man-management I wanted to have a set of tactics that offered me the possibility of winning in every match. This is not to say that I would or could win every match. It is sufficient to be equal or above AI performance in terms of match stats in general terms. If each match guarantees a level of performance that offers a chance of victory, then a combination of quality man-management, good play and luck will result in a winning record. Matches you should have lost will transform into draws, and draws become wins. Once that plateau is reached, consistent performance becomes more related to media and player management and matches lost due to poor tactical implementation become few and far between.
Home Framework
The home framework may seem on face evidence overly attacking and unrealistic. Both central defenders are given attacking mentalities, which would seem to be unusual instructions for the position. But, what it does is ensure that the defence, in a match in which the tactic is effective, concentrates 75% of its energies supporting the attack and only 25% on defending. If the team is playing to form then that statistic is acceptable, as a home team should be looking to attack considerably more often than defend. However, if the team is having a bad day then the user manager should adjust the formation to provide more defensive stability before trying to buck the troops up at half-time.
The home framework offers solid performance levels as long as the team is playing equal or above its quality level. The odd occasion in which they fall below this level will require some tactical adjustments and quality man-management at half-time. Ideally, the user manager will realise his team is below par early enough in the half to switch to a more defensively sound formation and thus minimise any damage. Early indicators for team performance are possession and pass percentage. Although neither really stabilises until the 10th minute, an advantage for the AI after this point in either or both stats is an indication that you have either got your tactics wrong or that the team is performing below expectations.
The home framework mentality ensures that the team is looking to attack more often than not. It will force players to take attacking risks and forwards to have a shoot on sight mentality. It will fall down heavily against sides of a higher level that will destroy it on the counter, but, in my experience, that only happens against teams operating in higher divisions.
Mentality
GK 14
DC 15
FB 16
MCd 17
ML/R 18
MCa 19
FC 20
There is a set of theories complementing this mentality framework that will be discussed later.
Away Framework
The basic away framework operates as a negative copy of the home framework. In opposition to the home framework, it concentrates entirely on defending. Assuming that the home side is focusing on attacking moves >75% of the time, a tactic that has eight of its eleven players focused on defending to greater degree should provide some stability. As three players are, although still defensive, looking to attack above 25% of the time there should be some attacking potential on the counter-attack. It primarily focuses on stopping the opposition playing and only looks to score from lightening raids and set pieces.
As for the home tactic, indicators of performance are possession and pass percentage. Unlike the home tactic, in which you should be seeing a relative advantage for your team, matching AI performance, you should be looking to match the AI in both areas. Possession should ideally hover around 50% but this can’t be guaranteed for away tactics. As long as it isn’t falling below 47% you should be relatively happy. Pass percentage is a more solid indicator of performance away and you should see your team dominate in this area. However, if you are achieving over 50% possession, pass percentage importance decreases.
Mentality
GK 1
DC 2
FB 3
MCd 4
ML/R 5
MCa 6
FC 7
There is a set of theories complementing this mentality framework that will be discussed later.
And there my frameworks would have ended had I finished writing the article the same day I started it. However, there has been a time delay, during which time I have discovered some limitations of the away framework. Before discussing them and an alternate framework to combat them, it is necessary to turn our attention to the intricacies of re-ranking and match odds to offer some reasoning behind the limitations.
Re-Ranking and Pre-Match Odds
I previously wrote that re-ranking was happening on a match-by-match basis and this constituted a greater level of sophistication in AI responses to user performance. I will now refute that in returning to my original position that re-ranking occurs mid-season (in a minor form) and with greater degree at the end of season. The pre-match odds are an indicator of recent form. The combination of the two will suggest how the AI will line up against you.
In my most recently completed season I was the bookmakers’ favourite for relegation, being predicted to come 24th with odds of 80-1 to be champions. Not surprisingly, this meant that all of the AI teams expected to beat me when I played away against them. Naturally, I consistently came up against attacking formations. Early season odds had the AI team as heavy favourite for my away games, with my home games being close calls either way. In the away games the ultra-defensive mentality of the Away Framework negated the heavy attacking strategy of the AI and I performed pretty consistently away from home. If the AI scored first I was in trouble, but if I could frustrate them for the first hour I would usually sneak a one or two-nil victory.
This tactic had also worked effectively the previous season when I had also been predicted to come 24th (in L2) and had walked the division, losing three games in total. In L1 it was less effective as player for player I was often out-matched, but my away record was pretty solid. I had a major injury crisis mid-season (four goalies and three centre forwards out simultaneously is tough to cover for a small club with few resources), which knocked me down from challenging for the title to mid-table. I regained form as my players returned to fitness and ended up in a play-off spot, finishing only 3 points away from automatic promotion. I was two minutes away from going up in the play-off final when, out of the blue, as I had seen no chances against for 10 minutes, the AI equalised and went on to win in the penalty shoot-out. The whole season ruined in the space of a few short minutes!
But, with every cloud comes a silver lining. I strengthened the squad and readied myself for a serious crack at the title. I was pretty confident that I would dominate the division as my player quality had improved dramatically. My pre-season odds were 8-1, and all the away games were short-odds either way. Sorted, or so I thought. It was then a wrecking ball smashed my illusory self-confidence to smithereens. My away performances had only needed to shift in level slightly for me to pick up the extra few points I needed for automatic promotion. As I had a much better first eleven I was sure they would do. However, in the away games I was getting pounded. I barely managed a shot on goal. The opposition dominated me. Something was seriously wrong.
The AI was now playing less aggressively against me. Previously, I had played my ultra-conservative tactics against high mentality / high defensive line systems and undid them through committed defence and lightening breaks. However, as the AI was now playing more conservatively against me, my through balls to the breaking forwards were now being intercepted by the deeper lying defenders and recycled back to the AI attack. I held out for a couple of draws due to magnificent performances from my centre-backs and keeper, but I was never going to win any away games this way. A rethink was required.
I had already designed an alternate away tactic for the theoretical games in which I would be the favourite despite not being at home. Due to my poor pre-season ranking this had rarely happened (twice only) so I hadn’t really tested it. However, logically it should work as it followed my defensive theories in order to remain defensively sound, but increased mentalities throughout the team. I implemented it for my next few away games to give it an extended run out. The result was outstanding. Since the shift in mentalities I have won all bar one away game (which was a cup game against higher level opposition). Had I not shifted I would have been average the first half of the season before the AI teams decided I was cannon fodder away, at which time my successful strategy would reinsert itself as the AI began to attack me again. If I hadn’t come to terms with the tactical switch required early in the season, a serious bout of frustration would have ensued. I’m sure one or two FMers have experienced the scenario of over-performing, strengthening the squad pre-season before crashing and burning without realising why. Fortunately, I reacted quickly enough to minimise the morale damage the away performances would bring and, with the new tactical plan in operation, embarked on the successful run I had envisioned pre-season.
Attacking Away Framework
Although most settings are unchanged from the Away Framework, the mentality switch ensures a more aggressive performance without compromising too much on defensive stability. As this framework should be employed on short-odds away games in which the AI can be assumed to play a conservative attacking game, the defensive compromise should be negligible. At the same time, the forwards will be operating further up the pitch which will place the deeper defensive line employed by the AI under more pressure than the away tactic. Simply, the mentality framework places the last line of defence, the centre-backs, on same mentality as the first line of attack in the Away Framework.
Mentality
GK 6
DC 7
FB 8
MCd 9
ML/R 10
MCa 11
FC 12
As for the previous frameworks, there is a set of theories complementing this mentality framework that will be discussed later.
A Hypothetical Framework
It may be that these three frameworks offer all that is required to defeat the various permutations of AI tactics. However, as I am yet to reach the higher echelons of the game, I am not certain if even the attacking away framework will suffice when your team is all conquering. This level of performance may well require a final, fourth framework to outperform AI teams that play semi-defensive formations at home. The hypothesized framework is based on the assumption that the attacking stratum, the forwards, should operate on the same mentality as the most defensive stratum of the Home Framework.
Mentality
GK 9
DC 10
FB 11
MCd 12
ML/R 13
MCa 14
FC 15
It is interesting to note that no secondary home framework seems to be required. Even with a team predicted to come dead last, the Home Framework outperforms the AI tactics. The only issue with it is its lack of cutting edge against weak teams that park a bus in front of the goal, but again, these issues can be minimised by applying certain attacking theories.
Theorems
Passing, Width & Tempo
These three settings are intrinsically related and are vital to get right when designing tactics. If you have lots of short passing in an ultra wide formation, passes will be constantly under hit and the opposition will frequently intercept the ball mid-move and counter. Likewise, long balls and a narrow formation will reduce possession percentages as the only option for most players will be a pump up to the FC who will be surrounded by both his own team and the opposition as players are so close together, so his flick ons are likely to be very ineffective. Although you can play a quick tempo with short passing you need highly technical players to do this, and as technique stats seem to have reduced considerably since ’06, you will require a world-class side to pull it off.
If you watch quality teams play in real life, you will notice that it is the central midfield that sets the tempo. Think Viera with Arsenal, Keane with Man Utd. When Keane was at his peak, his quick winning of the ball, bringing it forward from defence and pinging counter-attacking balls forward to the breaking midfielders was the fulcrum off the team. When Veron joined, his slower playmaking style disrupted the team and results fell away. As in real life, when designing your tactics link the tempo and width with your MCs’ passing.
Basically, set the MCs’ passing to whatever passing style you would like your team to play, be it a continentalesque 5, a very Premiership 10, or a LLM 15. Adjust the team width and tempo sliders to match. Then, adjust the passing of the players operating behind the MCs (central defenders, full-backs and goalkeeper) to be slightly (2-5 clicks) longer than the MCs, and the players operating higher up the pitch (wingers and forwards) to be slightly shorter (2-5 clicks).
The logic of this system is based around the position players take on the pitch and how close players are to them when they have the ball. In general, defenders, when in possession and under little pressure, are further away from their nearest player than midfielders or attacker are. So a more direct passing style is more viable. Employing such a style also offers them more passing options, as a direct through ball could find a breaking winger and set a one-pass attacking move in motion. However, when an attacking player is in possession, he is, unless on a quick break, likely to be surrounded by team mates who are all operating in a small zone of the pitch. Short, intricate passing is needed in such situations for moves to succeed.
Defensive Line
The defensive line links heavily with whatever mentality framework you have chosen. Defender attributes, specifically pace and positioning, will allow for some level of line adjustment but I would advise not placing the defensive line in a position that unlinks it from the framework. Simply put, the defensive line should be placed at mid-point of the framework mentality. Thus, if you have chosen to implement the attacking framework, with player mentalities ranging from 14-20, you would position the defensive line at midpoint between the two (17). If you have chosen the heavily defensive away formation (1-7), you would set the defensive line at four.
If you have quick defenders who have good positioning stats you could happily place the defensive line higher than the mid-point of the mentality framework in confidence that their pace and ability to read the game will allow them to cover any counter-attacks over the top with relative ease. However, if they are slower than average, then dropping the d-line back slightly will allow them to cover quick attackers without becoming over exposed to balls over their heads into the space behind them.
Closing Down
Defenders
Although I appreciated supersaint’s experiments on mirroring closing down with the defensive line, unfortunately my final conclusion is that I don’t agree with him. His matching of the defensive line to average mentality, as explained above, is exemplary and a cornerstone of the theorems, but in my opinion, quality defending relies on low closing down (3-5). Low closing down defenders hold their position and thus require the attacker to do something special to get past them. If they close down heavily, they may well reduce space for the player on the ball, but they also leave space behind them that can be too easily exploited for my liking. Therefore, for both home and away frameworks, I keep closing down low for the defence.
Central Midfielders
Midfielders’ closing down is the only closing down instruction I regulate heavily through the frameworks. Like the defensive line, their closing down links to the framework I have selected. Thus, in the high mentality home framework, they close down to the same setting as the defensive line (17), whereas in the away framework they only close down to four. The logic behind this is that in the home framework they will be high up the pitch most of the time, so heavy closing down is likely to win the ball in or near the opposition’s half, which will be dangerous for them. If they fail to win the ball there is little damage done to the user team, as the defence are still reasonably high up the pitch and should cover any through ball/attacking move. However, in the defensive framework, high closing down for midfielders will be taking place in front of their own penalty area which is exceedingly dangerous should they miss the tackle. So, I prefer them to hold position with low closing down, which forces the AI players to try something, rather than offering them space if my player makes a mistake.
DMCs
If employing a DMC you will need to play higher closing down than if you employ pure MCs. If you follow the above guide, the DMC will be dragged into the defensive line and provide no cover. Therefore, he should be closing down reasonably heavily in front of the defensive line to offer the protection you are looking for.
Attackers and Wingers
One of the common user complaints in FM07 is the difficulty of defending deep crosses or balls over the top of the defence. Getting the closing down settings for the forwards and wingers correct seems to counter this. The key, certainly in away formations, is to close down heavily and have easy tackling. This gets your players in position to challenge the AI player in possession, but not to tackle him, unless the tackle is obviously ‘on’. However, you put him under enough pressure to ensure he can’t hit comfortable through balls or quality crosses into the box, as the forward or winger is blocking the ball. Since I employed these settings I have hardly ever conceded a goal from deep passes or crosses.
Marking
Home Tactics
It is important to tight mark with the defence to reduce space for opposition attackers. As man-marking has finally been fixed (7.0.1), I prefer to man mark the opposition with the defence, although tight zonal should work equally well. The rest of the team generally focuses on attacking, so to ensure they are often in space, loose zonal marking seems to be the best option.
Away Tactics
For the away tactics I recommend tight man-marking across the board for midfield and defence, as it is the best way to reduce space for the opposition. The forwards should remain loose marking though so they are available to pick up pressure relieving balls from the defence.
Tackling
Home Tactics
One of the simplest settings in the game, I have everybody on normal tackling. I want the team to contest balls all over the pitch, but generally rely on my heavy pressing midfield and attack to force the opposition to play quicker balls than they would wish to regain possession.
Away Tactics
Here, things are a little more complex. I would suggest a combination of easy, hard and normal. The only normal tacklers are the central defenders and the goalkeeper. This is because most tackles they make are likely to be in the penalty area and hard tackling gives away too many dead ball situations, so penalties will become commonplace. However, as the midfield and full-backs should normally be outside the box, I have them on heavy tackling. I would rather give away a free kick with a heavy challenge outside the box than allow opposing midfielders to opportunity to outmuscle my midfield and play uncontested passes towards a deep defensive line. Finally, the wingers and forwards are on easy tackling, as their job is to block deep passes and crosses into the area. I don’t want to risk them missing tackles and allowing uncontested balls in, rather I want them to hold their positions and make things as difficult as possible for the AI player in possession.
Forward Runs
The way forward runs works is a key change in the match engine between 06 and 07. In 06, leaving your forwards on high forward runs was fundamental to their settings and guaranteed a lot of goals. Now, all it guarantees is a lot of offsides. The best settings for forward runs seem to be, and I’m happy to be challenged on this, as follows:
GK: Rarely
DC: Rarely
FB: Mixed at home, Rarely away
MCd: Rarely
MR/L: Often at home, Mixed away
MCa: Often
FCd/TM: Rarely
FCa: Mixed
Split Midfield/Attack Forward Runs
I devised these split runs based on observations of the game engine. The AI, in a 4-4-2 formation, always had one central midfielder staying back and one joining the attack. In ’06 I used to have a mixed/often split for home tactics, but this seemed to give the AI too much space in front of the d-line when they countered. Likewise, a rarely/mixed split meant my midfielders through balls were being played from too deep on the park and were being easily intercepted by the AI. Thus, a rarely/often split seemed the way to go and has proved to be highly successful.
The AI does seem to play two forward running forwards. This is one of the reasons that user were struggling to contend with quick counter attacks. Therefore, one of your forwards should at least have forward runs to mixed to offer the AI the same problems. However, it does seem advantageous to have the other FC having forward runs to rarely, as he can then drop deep to pick up balls for the midfield and allow the wingers to get ahead of him. Once he has turned, he then has options to run at the defence or play a through ball to the breaking winger. This seems to create a lot of good scoring opportunities.
Target Man
I would advise the target man to have forward runs set to rarely because he plays with his back to goal. Giving him these settings allows him to win a lot of balls in the air or hold the ball up when played to feet which brings a lot of other players into the game.
Playmaker
Usually operating as a pure AMC, a playmaker should also have forward runs set to rarely. This will allow him to drop deep, pick up the ball and influence the game. If you are playing a flat 4-4-2, it may be worthwhile dropping the forward runs of the MCa to mixed if you wish to employ him as a playmaker.
Time Wasting
I mirror time wasting with the defensive line settings. If you choose the home framework, with the defensive line ranging from 15-19, then time wasting should be set at 5-1. Likewise, as the away framework is designed with frustrating the opposition in mind, time wasting should be at 15-19. The mixed time wasting settings for the attacking away framework work exceptionally well, with players attacking in the last 10 mins when a goal down, but time wasting if they are a goal up. The difference with the away framework is that your players will time waste if the scores are level.
Creative Freedom
Many posts on the forums are of the assumption that the creative freedom slider stops a player from obeying other individual instructions. If it is set high then a player will be more unlikely to do what he is told, if set low then he will adhere to instructions. I believe there are elements of truth to this, but it is not the whole story.
A player on high creative freedom will inevitably look for options in attack as soon as he gets the ball. If he decides that the creative/killer ball is on he will play it. Sometimes it will come off, sometimes it won't. That is the very nature of creativity in all walks of life. If he decides the creative/killer ball is unfeasible, he will play a safe ball and move into position to try again. Hence, decision making is also key to a truly great creative player. A creative player with good decision making will invariably choose the right time to play the right ball. Other factors will influence whether it comes off, such as the defensive stats of the opposition players trying to intercept the ball/tackle the creative player and the off the ball/decision making stats of the player trying to pick up the pass, but on the whole a player with good creativity/decision making will create chances. Alternatively, a player with good creativity/bad decision making will often try to play unfeasibly difficult balls that will result in interceptions and counter attacking moves more often than creating chances for his own team. When setting instructions for such a player, be aware that giving him total freedom will likely result in you losing possession and having to defend quick countering moves as often as getting into scoring positions yourself.
Finally, in terms of creative freedom for the whole team, be careful setting it too high for too many players. If you do this, too many people will be looking for the killer ball, and your truly creative players will have less opportunity to influence a game. Also, too many passes are likely to be intercepted as they are being hit from unfeasible positions on the pitch, and possession will turn over almost the second you have the ball. Tweak it high for a few players, and let the others focus on more mundane tasks, such as defending or scoring goals.
Team Instructions
Use Target Man
This setting works exceedingly well and can create a plethora of chances if used correctly. The archetypal target man, tall, big and strong, can be devastating when set to no forward runs and balls played to head, to feet, or mixed. Obviously, if you want him to run onto ball forward runs are required.
Use Playmaker
A playmaker needs to be in position to pick up easy balls, so giving him high forward runs into attacking zones will lessen his effectiveness. Low or mixed forward runs, low closing down, loose, zonal marking and possibly free role will enable you to get the most out of a playmaker.
Play Offside
Use it in conjunction with a high defensive line, so if the offside trap is beaten your defenders will have time to get back and cover. Thus, it is ideal for the home framework, but less effective for the away ones. Obviously, there is a greater risk in employing it if all your defenders are slow.
Counter Attack
Counter attack is, somewhat ironically, counter intuitive. It does not mean that your players will sprint forward into attacking positions once you get the ball, but rather your players will only launch attacks that are definitely ‘on’. Thus, it is a defensive measure. I use it for all tactics and only turn it off when I come up against tactics in which the opposition is time wasting from the word go. It does mean you won’t see a lot of big wins, but it also guarantees a level of defensive stability that allows your side to grind out one or two nil victories.
Individual Instructions
Run With Ball, Long Shots, Through Balls and Cross Ball
My default set-up, for both home and away tactics, is to have no player doing any of the above instructions more often than mixed. This ensures stability in the tactic as no player gets undone by constantly following the same game plan against an opponent who is better than him. If you are sure your player will be able to heavily influence the game with often instructions because he is obviously better than his marker, then, and only then, turn his relevant instructions to often. When this works it is a joy to behold.
Cross From
Home Tactics: Wingers cross from byline, full-backs from mixed.
Away Tactics: Wingers cross from mixed, full-backs from deep.
Cross Aim
This depends considerably on your tactical set up. If you have a tall, strong target man it can be more than worthwhile aiming to target man. If both strikers are good in the air then mixed is the best option. If one striker is considerably faster than his opponent, aim for him at near post. If both strikers will get constantly beaten to the ball, aim for far post and hope your winger out jumps the opposing full back.
Swap Position
Best used with MCs or FCs. If you have a playmaker MC, the swap position roles will keep him as a playmaker, but sometimes drop him deeper and sometimes play him higher up the pitch. This can pull the opposition around very effectively. Likewise, a target man striker who is also fast can switch between the rare forward runs and mixed forward runs roles and, with balls at mixed, can run riot.
Free Role
Especially effective in conjunction with an AMC playmaker.
Hold Up Ball
This seems to give your team an advantage if set the right way. For a while, in conjunction with others, I was testing tactics with 7 players holding up the ball. This was sound defensively and helped hugely with Rule of Two tactics. However, with the Rule of One framework, a better setting seemed to be having the players operating on the outside and in front of the defence (i.e. full-backs and MCd) holding up the ball, which allowed the team to regain its shape and counter. The target man or FCd should also hold up the ball to allow other players to get in front of him when attacking.
Forward Arrows
I have only experimented with the standard forward arrows on a 4-4-2 tactic i.e. long forward arrows at home, short forward arrows away, and they are very effective. They are basic position aids to help you get players forward or backwards (when employing backward arrows) in order to complement offensive or defensive situations. I’m still reliably informed that side arrowing the forwards when the AI goes to 4-2-4, together with balls played down the flanks, disrupts the AI formation and often results in a goal.
Hypotheticals
I haven’t tested this scenario, but it makes logical sense to me and should work.
Focus Passing
As my frameworks can only operate between a width of three and a width of eighteen due to the pass, tempo, width, MC linking, it seems sensible to divide the focus passing element into three different settings.
Width 3-7: Passing Focus Down the Middle
Width 8-13: Passing Focus Mixed
Width 14-18: Passing Focus Down Both Flanks
Opposition Instructions
I only use these from the start when playing against the Chelsea 4-5-1/4-3-3 system, against which I force the AML and AMR onto the wrong foot. Hypothetically, if you have a good tactical and player quality scout, he will also give you good information on the opposition’s danger man and you can use opposition instructions to snuff out his threat. However, if your scout is dodgy, you may well find you are marking the wrong player out of the game, so be careful at lower levels.
Scouting Knowledge
Many players are having success in preparing instructions that counter the AI manager’s preferred playing style. Thus, if he is high tempo and aggressive, a low tempo, possession game should nullify his tactics. I am unable to verify this as I play on a Mac, and one of the Mac’s idiosyncratic bugs is to inform me that every manager is ‘very cautious’. However, in theory it is a fine idea and could be used to apply pre-game tweaks to your preferred tactic.
Variations
With thanks to The Next Diaby.
I am still using more closing down for FBs (10-14) and it has a great impact on restricting space for opposition wingers.
Another SI winner: forward runs. They are very powerful now, and they allow close to "real-life" setups throughout the whole team! E.g. if using a DMC, forward runs and right instructions can turn your FBs into driving forces for the whole team. Or you can determine if your AMC is a playmaker or a 2nd/3rd striker or if your DMC is an anchorman or deep lying playmaker. Who could ask for more?
I am using forward runs "often" for the strong striker, since I am using a fast target man. I did not see too many offsides that way (most of them are a bit slower anyway...), and the strong striker goes into position, while the fast striker is looking for a position to play the pass/cross or convert on his own.
Man-Management and Media Interaction
Pre-Game Odds and the Media
Getting your interaction with the media wrong pre-game can be catastrophic. If you tell the media that you expect a win with a close odds game, your players are likely to freeze and perform way below expectations. Deal with the media as follows:
Really close odds: No comment
Heavily favoured to win at home: We can win this if we play to our best
Heavily favoured to win away: They could cause us problems
Heavily favoured to lose away: I just want a good performance
Heavily favoured to lose at home: They could cause us problems
This seems to minimize poor player reaction and generally keeps morale levels high.
Pre-Game Team Talks
Generally, the ‘we can win this’ is the best option for home games and the ‘wish luck’ the best for away games. However, the ‘no pressure’ option works well against good sides and the ‘do it for the fans’ against local rivals. I rarely employ the ‘I expect a win option’, preferring the ‘we can win this’ followed by a ‘disappointed’ at half-time if the performance isn’t matching the pre-match odds.
Half-Time Team Talks
When your team has good morale a ‘disappointed’ team talk works wonders at home if your team is performing below expectations. I have used it even when winning but playing less well than I would have wanted and seen an amazing second half performance. As in most away games you would have ‘wished luck’, a ‘we can win this’ if level or losing by one goal often changes the match. If you are winning, then ‘pleased’ does the trick, as it also does with a winning score line and good performance at home. If your morale levels are low, stay away from angry or disappointed comments and focus on encouraging.
Post-Match Team Talks
Generally, be positive post-match. If your team has lost away but played well, be pleased. If they have drawn at home but should have won, be pleased. Only lay into the players if they have performed way below expectations. You will know if you have judged the mood correctly if morale stays high.
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New To FM? Read This First!!!
New To FM? Read This First!!! -
07-15-2007, 08:57 PM
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